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Squaring the Circle? Bringing Deliberation and Participation Together in Processes of 
Constitution-Making  
Silvia Suteu and Stephen Tierney* 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter looks at recent participatory exercises in constitutional reform and aims to help 
further define and tailor standards for deliberative democratic good practice in constitution-
making. Among the models of popular participation which we discuss are constitutional 
referendums such as Scotland’s independence referendum; citizens’ assemblies such as those set 
up in British Columbia, the Netherlands, and Ontario; and constitutional conventions such as in 
Iceland and Ireland. On the one hand, these types of popular engagement very different from 
each other, and so too are the issues with which they are concerned, with mandates ranging from 
electoral reform to recommendations for constitutional amendments; to drafting an entirely new 
fundamental law; to, finally, deciding on the creation of a new state. On the other hand, they are 
all indicative of a trend in current constitutional practice. The recourse to the people has become 
the tool for constitutional legitimation, both internally and in the search for external validation.  
What is notable in terms of participatory practice is that the emphasis on fostering deliberation, 
in the Rawlsian sense of an environment conducive to public reason,1 is highly varied. In some, 
such as citizens’ assemblies, there are clear efforts towards facilitating micro-setting deliberative 
conversations. But both when these processes are extended to the macro-level referendum 
process, and in the other situations we address, appeals to deliberation are often either entirely 
overlooked or are tacked on seemingly as an after-thought to further strengthen legitimacy 
claims. 
This chapter aims to disentangle the principles required by, respectively, participatory and 
deliberative processes in constitution-making. While there is significant overlap between them 
(such as conditions of inclusiveness and transparency), important differences exist. Questions 
about the balance between the respective roles of elite and popular actors; the size and working 
methods of the constitution-making body; the role attributed to ‘expert’ and various other actors 
in the process; and the rules of decision-making will each result in different answers when 
looked at through a participatory or a deliberative lens. Our chapter seeks to help disaggregate 
these discrete aspects of popular democracy and in doing so to offer some much needed clarity 
given such diffuse proliferation of popular constitutional processes.  
We discuss the turn towards deliberative mechanisms in constitutional change and recent seminal 
examples. We then draw out some of the problems in connecting small group deliberation to 
polity-wide participation. We conclude with some thoughts about how these two strands in 
popular constitutional engagement might be better connected. 
2. The turn to participation and deliberation in constitutional practice 
                                                          
* Silvia Suteu is Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Laws, University College London; Stephen Tierney is Professor of 
Constitutional Theory in the School of Law, University of Edinburgh.  
1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (expanded edn, Columbia University Press 2005) 446-47. 
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The participation of citizens in constitutional change has come partly as the by-product of the 
proliferation of referendums, and partly through experiments in micro-processes of participation: 
citizens’ assemblies, constitutional conventions, citizen juries, etc. Indeed, the two developments 
are not unconnected. It is frequently the case that the deliberations of the smaller group presage a 
wider regional or national popular process, most commonly through a subsequent referendum. 
The citizens’ assembly processes in British Columbia 2004, the Netherlands 2006, and Ontario 
2006 are examples of this, as are the Icelandic and Irish constitutional conventions. 
While this sequencing has been the most common one in practice, we can also envisage it the 
other way around: a referendum as providing the mandate for constitutional change through 
deliberation, including via micro-deliberative forums. This is what the Scottish Government 
promised had there been a vote for independence: to set up a constitutional convention tasked 
with drafting Scotland’s permanent constitution.2 Had these plans gone forward, they would have 
provided an example of participation reinforcing the mandate for deliberation, possibly making it 
more difficult for the outcome of the deliberative exercise to be sidelined politically (which has 
happened to an extent in all examples of constitutional conventions).  
i. The role of the referendum in explaining the participation/deliberation 
relationship 
The proliferation of referendums has taken place in a number of important areas of constitutional 
decision-making: the creation of new states; the creation and amendment of constitutions; the 
establishment of complex new models of sub-state autonomy, as we have seen in the UK and 
Spain; and the accession to and the transfer of sovereign powers from European states to the 
European Union.3 It is perhaps on account of the prominence of these issues that focus is 
growing upon the ways in which decisions are made when the public is given a direct say in 
fundamental constitutional questions. 
In certain cases, and under the right conditions, it does seem that referendums can be positive 
ventures in promoting participation. However, it is less clear that they also promote deliberation, 
in the sense of inducing ‘public reason’ – in terms of the open exchange of reasons in public fora 
and the preparedness of participants to listen, reflect and, if they feel it correct to do so, to 
change their views. 
There are two major problems that are often identified in referendum practice which prevent the 
fostering of a genuinely deliberative decision-making process. These we can call ‘the elite 
control syndrome’ and ‘the deliberation deficit’. The former is the idea that referendums promise 
popular power, including control over elites, but are themselves so open to manipulation as to 
belie that promise. The charge is that elites can dominate the process of referendums in such a 
way as to procure a particular result. By Lijphart’s famous formulation, ‘most referendums are 
both controlled and pro-hegemonic’.4 In this sense, people do participate in a referendum, but 
this participation is a veneer. The strings are really being pulled by the elite, usually the 
                                                          
2 The Scottish Government, The Scottish Independence Bill: A Consultation on an Interim Constitution for Scotland, 
June 2014, 61. 
3 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). 
4 Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries 
(Yale University Press 1984) 203.  
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government, which have set the referendum and which can control crucial process elements such 
as question-setting, timing and funding/spending rules, to deliver the result they want. 
This raises a broader question: what is meant by citizen participation in electoral democracy? 
Voting is in a sense the thinnest form of participation. But it tends to be how participation is 
evaluated: How many people register to vote? How many people vote? However, participation 
should not just involve voting. Do citizens really engage in public reasoning at these electoral 
moments or are their choices conditioned by politicians?  
This then leads to the second main criticism of referendums (although it is a critique that also 
resonates with elections more broadly). The idea of a deliberation deficit suggests that 
referendums by their nature facilitate or indeed encourage the mere aggregation of individual 
wills and in doing so fail to foster either the acquisition of information by, or the active 
deliberation of, citizens. In other words, not only is the citizen’s role passive and conditional, it is 
also very often one which the citizen does not prioritise as particularly significant. By this 
argument, people enter the referendum process with pre-formed views and therefore the 
referendum, as a simple act of voting Yes or No, becomes a conduit through which these views 
can be expressed, often hastily, without discussion or reflection, and hence without any 
possibility that minds might be changed and preferences transformed.  
Again this criticism causes us to reflect upon deliberation as being much more than just 
participation. Whereas the latter is concerned primarily with who and how many people may 
take part in a decision-making process, the deliberation deficit focuses on the how of 
participation: how do people make decisions? What is the quality of the process?  
The aims of a deliberative process will be explored below, but a key goal is the active 
participation of citizens. It can be argued that it is not enough that citizens participate in a 
passive, voting capacity; instead there should also be efforts to foster more involvement in 
reflection and discussion, but also, crucially, in helping to frame the issue at stake and in playing 
an earlier and more proactive role in the making of the decisions that flow from this issue-
framing role. This also suggests that there is certainly overlap between the two core ideas of 
participation and deliberation. The elite control and deliberation deficit criticisms recognise that 
participation exists but the charge is that this participation is thin, often involving the act of 
voting, but perhaps not much else. 
ii. Small groups: filling the deliberation gap – but only for some?  
What we have seen in recent decades is the development of smaller group engagements with 
citizens, including mechanisms for achieving constitutional change. There is now an array of 
tools, both formal and informal, which countries around the world have used to achieve 
legislative and constitutional reform. These experiments with deliberative mini-publics, 
understood as ‘forums, usually organised by policy-makers, where citizens representing different 
viewpoints are gathered together to deliberate on a particular issue in small-N groups’,5 range 
from citizens’ assemblies and constitutional conventions to citizen juries, deliberative polls and 
                                                          
5 K Groenlund, A Baechtiger and M Setala, Deliberative Mini-Publics: Involving Citizens in the Democratic 
Process (ECPR Press 2014) 1. 
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participatory budgeting. Indeed, among the numerous mechanisms for public engagement – one 
study has listed over 100 different types6 – mini-publics themselves seem to be on the rise. 
Among all these, citizens’ assemblies have been deemed to stand out as ‘the most extensive 
modern form of collective decision-making by common folk’ and as representing ‘the only 
method of citizen policymaking that combines all the following characteristics: a relatively large 
group of ordinary people; lengthy periods of learning and deliberation; and a collective decision 
with important political consequences for an entire political system’.7 The cases of British 
Columbia, the Netherlands and Ontario may be considered antecedents, with British Columbia in 
particular being a ground-breaking experiment with a citizens’ assembly, sparking a 
‘demonstration effect’ in the other two8 and, subsequently, in Iceland and Ireland.9 All three 
antecedents were aimed at effecting electoral reform, which although clearly a constitutional 
issue, is narrow in scope. The citizens involved had several months to learn about and deliberate 
on the best electoral system for their respective polity, with significant resources devoted to 
facilitating their work. These three cases shared a commitment to participatory and deliberative 
democracy aimed at ‘inject[ing] some popular legitimacy into policymaking’.10  
Citizens’ assemblies have also provided the model for constitutional conventions which, unlike 
the elite-driven constitution-making bodies of the past,11 seek the direct involvement of ordinary 
citizens in processes of piecemeal or full-scale constitutional revision. Understood generically as 
a ‘representative body collected together to discuss constitutional change’,12 citizens’ assemblies 
– termed by some ‘people’s conventions’ – are united by several traits. Perhaps the most 
important commonality is the centrality of citizens tasked with deciding important constitutional 
reforms in a deliberative setting. According to one author, the shared characteristics of such 
bodies are that: (1) they ‘address big, national questions of constitutional/institutional design;’ 
(2) they ‘are established by government to meet a certain objective in time-delimited fashion;’ 
(3) they are ‘deliberately and distinctly treated as a supplement (rather than competitor) to the 
existing system of representative democracy;’ (4) they include ordinary citizens; (5) their 
‘membership is based on random selection rather than election’ (although this is not always true, 
as shown by Iceland); (6) the roadmap for the deliberative process is clear from the start and (7) 
‘the heart of the enterprise is deliberation’.13 Cases such as Iceland 2009-2011 and Ireland 2012-
2014, as well as the lesser known Romanian National Forum 2013 and Estonian Citizens’ 
Assembly Process 2013, involved citizens’ assembly-style constitutional conventions tasked with 
                                                          
6 Gene Rowe and Lynn J. Frewer, ‘A Typology of Public Engagement Mechanisms’, Science, Technology, & 
Human Values, 30:2 (2005), 257. 
7 Patrick Fournier et al., When Citizens Decide: Lessons from Citizens’ Assemblies on Electoral Reform (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 10. 
8 Ibid., 28. 
9 For more on the experience of British Columbia, see Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, Designing Deliberative 
Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
10 Fournier, When Citizens Decide, 18. 
11 See Andrew Arato, ‘Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy’ 17:2 (1995) Cardozo Law 
Review 191 and ‘Conventions, Constituent Assemblies, and Round Tables: Models, Principles and Elements of 
Democratic Constitution-Making’, (2012) 1:1 Global Constitutionalism 173.  
12 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Do We Need a Constitutional Convention for 
the UK?, Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, 25 March 2013, 9.  
13 David M. Farrell, ‘The Irish Constitutional Convention: A Bold Step or a Damp Squib?’ in John O’Dowd and 
Giuseppe Ferrari eds., 75 Years of the Constitution of Ireland: An Irish-Italian Dialogue (Clarus Press 2013) 191, 
195. 
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preparing concrete recommendations for constitutional reform, and in the Icelandic case, a full 
constitutional draft.  
Iceland’s process involved two large national forums in 2009 and 2010 (numbering 1,500 and 
950 members, respectively) and a 25-strong elected Constitutional Council working over several 
months in 2011 to produce a draft for a new constitution on the basis of these forums’ 
recommendations. A referendum was held in October 2012 and asked, among six questions, 
whether the Constitution Council’s proposals should form the basis of a new draft Constitution. 
Despite the proposition being approved in the referendum, the draft never came into force, 
having failed to be adopted by Parliament and dropping from the list of priorities following new 
elections in 2013. 
Ireland’s case was different, in that the major political parties agreed that constitutional reform 
was needed.14 The 2011-2016 Programme for Government15 indicated that a Constitutional 
Convention would be established to operate for twelve months and ‘to consider comprehensive 
constitutional reform’ on eight major issues. Moreover, amidst the legislative activity towards 
establishing a constitutional convention, a group of academics, inspired by other recent 
experiments with citizens’ assemblies, set up the We the Citizens initiative,16 whose ‘aim was to 
demonstrate the virtue of deliberative approaches by holding our own (pilot) citizens’ 
assembly’.17 The Parliament established the Constitutional Convention in 2012 – which was to 
consist of 100 members, a third of whom were to be politicians – and run for a period of 12 
months. The convention was to produce reports on eight issues listed in its terms of reference but 
could also propose ‘such other relevant constitutional amendments’ as it deemed fit. Importantly, 
the Government committed to responding to the Convention’s reports within four months as well 
as to indicating a timeframe for submitting accepted recommendations to a referendum. The 
response from the government was, in the end, mixed (more on this below), and of the two 
constitutional amendments submitted for a referendum only one has been successful.  
There are several problems with arguments that such micro-deliberations can solve 
participation’s woes. First, there are anterior questions about the very legitimacy of those who 
engage in small group deliberation: How are small groups appointed? Whom do they represent 
and how is that representative role guaranteed? John Parkinson puts it this way: ‘How can micro 
deliberation be democratic at all, given that it cannot include even a small number of those 
affected, let alone all of them’?18 Some suggest that small groups, if representative, can speak for 
the people as a whole. Dahl argues that: ‘The judgments of a minipopulus would “represent” the 
judgment of the demos … [and] would thus derive their authority from the legitimacy of 
                                                          
14 See the Parliament Joint Committee on the Constitution recommending the establishment of a citizens’ assembly 
to consider the question of electoral reform. Joint Committee on the Constitution, Fourth Report, ‘Article 16 of the 
Constitution: Review of the Electoral System for the Election of Members to Dáil Éireann [House of Deputies]’, 
Final Report, July 2010, available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees30thdail/j-
constitution/report_2008/20100722.pdf. See also Farrell (2013), pp. 2-3. 
15 Programme for Government 2011-2016, available at 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Work_Of_The_Department/Programme_for_Government/Programme_for_Govern
ment_2011-2016.pdf. 
16 See http://www.wethecitizens.ie/.  
17 Farrell et al. (2013), p. 102. 
18 John Parkinson, ‘Beyond “Technique”: The Role of Referendums in the Deliberative System’ (Referendums and 
Deliberative Democracy workshop, University of Edinburgh, 8 May 2009); see also John Parkinson, ‘Legitimacy 
Problems in Deliberative Democracy’ (2003) 51 Political Studies 180. 
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democracy’.19 But can we be so sure that this is accurate? Surely the risk is that we merely invent 
a new system of representative decision-making, the detachment of which popular involvement 
was supposed to remedy. And indeed, this may be less democratic than party politics, where 
representatives are at least answerable to the electorate. Therefore, it seems that small group 
deliberation, to be valid, must be seen as an intervention within broader citizen participation, and 
not a substitute for it. As Fishkin argues, ‘internal validity’ must be complemented by ‘external 
validity’.20  
The case studies discussed here have employed different methods of selection. British Columbia, 
for instance, resorted to a near-random draw from the electoral registry, later stratified by age 
and gender, to select and then invite its initial 160 members; two more members were later added 
to correct the absence of aboriginal representation.21 Iceland’s 2009 National Forum was made 
up of 1,200 randomly selected citizens and 300 representatives of interest groups and 
institutions, divided into 162 tables.22 The second National Forum was held in November 2010 
and was made up of around 950 (quasi-)randomly selected citizens; despite attempts to the 
contrary, it was only partially representative (although there was gender balance there were 
significant variations in representation based upon age and geography) and there was a strong 
element of self-selection in its composition.23 The Icelandic Constitutional Council, however, 
was to have between 25 and 31 members and be elected in a special election. The latter took 
place in October 2010, with 25 members being elected out of 522 candidates based on a 35% 
voter turnout.24 In Ireland, the Constitutional Convention’s membership was to consist of:  
a Chairperson to be appointed by the Government, 66 citizens entitled to vote at a 
referendum, randomly selected so as to be broadly representative of Irish society, a 
member of the Northern Ireland Assembly from each of the political parties in the 
Assembly which accepts an invitation from the Government; and members of the Houses 
of the Oireachtas, so as to be impartially representative of the Houses.25  
The Irish Convention thus had to ensure not just the representativeness of its regular citizens, but 
also of the 33 politician members. This involved inviting representatives of Irish and Northern 
Irish parliamentary parties and resulted in 29 members of the former (chosen so as to be 
‘impartially representative of the Houses’26) and four of the latter.27  
                                                          
19 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 342.  
20 Fishkin, ‘Deliberative Democracy and Constitutions’, 251. 
21 Archon Fung and Mark Warren, ‘British Columbia, Canada: Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform’ 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2011) 6 http://participedia.net/sites/default/files/case-
files/653_303_Case_Study_British_Columbia.pdf. 
22 For more on the forum, see its website: http://www.thjodfundur2009.is/english/. 
23 Hélène Landemore, ‘Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment’, J Political Philos 23: 2 (2015) 
166, 177-78. 
24 The results of the election were successfully challenged before the Supreme Court, which invalidated the results. 
Despite this ruling, a parliamentary resolution was adopted in March 2011 appointing the 25 delegates originally 
elected to the Assembly. 
25 See Resolution of the Houses of the Oireachtas of July, 2012, available at 
https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Terms_of_Reference.pdf.  
26 Dáil Éireann Debate, Constitutional Convention: Motion, 10 July 2012, 
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2012/07/10/00026.asp. 
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The fear that in setting up micro-deliberative forums we are merely replacing one representation 
model with another, possibly less accountable one is thus not ill-founded. In Iceland, the election 
for the Constitutional Council was successfully challenged before the Supreme Court on the 
basis of procedural irregularities but its results were later validated by the parliament appointing 
the same 25 winners. This cast doubts on the legitimacy of the body’s membership and its claim 
to represent the body politic.  
The statistical models of representation used in British Columbia and Ireland are also not without 
their critics. In Ireland, for example, there were fears that the selection mechanism had ended up 
excluding marginalised groups – a particularly concerning outcome given their centrality to some 
of the issues up for consideration by the Convention (same-sex marriage, reducing the voting 
age, the status of women etc.). Thus, while the majoritarian danger of referendums has to do with 
the decision-making method itself, the potential for an outcome that is not representative of all 
societal views, or of all views likely to be affected by constitutional change, is relevant to 
constitutional conventions as well. 
A second danger here is that we encounter the reverse problem to that of macro citizen-
engagement. If the focus turns too much towards the details of good deliberation, we can lose 
sight of the importance of mass participation as an essential step in the democratic validation of 
any decision. Whereas with a referendum it can be argued that a deliberation deficit ensues, with 
a small group assembly we also face a potential participation deficit. All examples of micro-
deliberation discussed above were concerned with trying to connect the small deliberative 
exercise to a broader public engagement. They attempted to achieve this in two ways. One was to 
set up public consultations and outreach initiatives and thereby both inform citizens of the 
ongoing work of these bodies and seek popular input during the process, in the form of formal 
and informal submissions. The other was to resort to referendums as a popular endorsement of 
the result. A closer look at the manner in which these aims were pursued, however, indicates that 
there was not always an awareness of the differing dynamics of broader participation and the 
deliberation exercises, nor of how to integrate them. 
Public outreach was promoted as a key feature in all the examples mentioned. For instance, the 
Icelandic Constitutional Council actively sought both to inform the public of its progress (by 
posting on its website meeting schedules and minutes, news, a newsletter etc.), as well as to have 
it participate and make suggestions along the way and for this purpose set up various social 
media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube). By the end of the Council’s work, the 
public had made some 360 proposals and more than 3,600 comments on the various available 
platforms.28 The most significant aspect of the process, and what earned the resulting draft the 
moniker of ‘world’s first crowdsourced constitution’, was that a feedback loop was established 
between the Council members and the public, with their feedback being integrated at various 
points in the drafting process.29  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 Six Northern Irish parties had been invited to send one representative each but the unionist parties declined to do 
so. See Mary Minihan, ‘Unionist parties decline invitation’, The Irish Times, 1 December 2012, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/unionist-parties-decline-invitation-1.209. 
28 Landemore, ‘Inclusive Constitution-Making’, 182. 
29 Ibid., 174. 
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Similarly, the Irish Convention invited submissions on the items on its list, including from Irish 
citizens living abroad,30 and received thousands, especially on the more controversial issues such 
as same-sex marriage or the relationship between church and state.31 The Convention also sought 
public input on items to be added to its agenda, and held regional meetings in October-November 
2013 for this purpose.32  
Whether and to what extent these submissions and comments from the public had an actual 
impact on the members of these constitutional conventions is less clear. For example, Iceland’s 
Constitutional Council provided ‘irregular, informal, and limited’ feedback to the suggestions 
received from the public, possibly due to the lack of resources and lack of institutionalisation of 
feedback-giving.33 The extent of citizen involvement also seems problematic, as evidenced by 
the small number of unique commentators on the Council’s online platforms and by the 
insufficient involvement of older, less technologically-savvy, or less motivated individuals.34  
When discussing the recourse to referendums in validating the findings of these small groups, we 
return to the initial dilemma, which is the difficulty of fostering deliberation in a mass process of 
popular engagement. This is not an insignificant issue. For example, it is notable that for all the 
energy put into the micro-process of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform, the referendum process was markedly less successful in fostering deliberation when the 
process moved to the referendum campaign.35 Ian Ward cites one poll carried out the February 
before the May referendum where ‘only half … of British Columbians say they [had] read, seen 
or heard anything’36 about the Assembly and shortly before the referendum nearly two-thirds of 
British Columbians still knew ‘very little’ (39%) or ‘nothing’ (25%) about the electoral system 
being proposed.37 It seems that in this process and in the similar one in Ontario in 2007,38 far 
more energy and resources were expended on the micro-process than in providing information, 
education and in fostering deliberation at the macro-level.39 Ward concludes that this suggests: 
a troubling disconnection between the public and the Citizen’s Assembly. For all the 
efforts of its members and support staff to publicise its activities and to obtain public 
                                                          
30 ‘Convention Calls on the Diaspora’, Department of Foreign Affairs, http://web.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=89511.  
31 Submissions are available online on the Constitutional Convention’s website, 
https://www.constitution.ie/Submissions.aspx.  
32 ‘Constitutional Convention announces public meetings nationwide’, Irish Examiner, 14 October 2013, 
http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/ireland/constitutional-convention-announces-public-meetings-
nationwide-610056.html.  
33 Landemore, ‘Inclusive Constitution-Making’, 182. 
34 Ibid., 183. 
35 Dennis Pilon, ‘The 2005 and 2009 Referenda on Voting System Change in British Columbia’ (2010) 4(2-3) 
Canadian Political Science Review 73.  
36 Ipsos-Reid, ‘BC Public Has A Lot To Learn About BC-STV’ (Ipsos, 21 February 2005) <http://www.ipsos-
na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=2566>, cited by Ian Ward, ‘The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on 
Electoral Reform. An Experiment in Political Communication’ (Australasian Political Studies Association 
conference, University of Newcastle, 25-27 September 2006) 
<http://www.newcastle.edu.au/Resources/Schools/Newcastle%20Business%20School/APSA/PUBPOLICY/Ward-
Ian.pdf>. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Karen Howlett, ‘Referendum? Now What Referendum Would That Be? Globe and Mail (Toronto, 24 September 
2007) <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/archives/article783471.ece>; LeDuc, ‘Electoral Reform’. 
39 Richard Simeon, ‘The Referendum Experience in Canada’ (Referendums and Deliberative Democracy workshop, 
University of Edinburgh, 8 May 2009).  
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input through public hearings and submissions via the internet, significant numbers of 
British Columbians appear to have been unaware of the Assembly’s existence and 
mission. This is a gap which will need to be closed if indeed citizens’ assemblies are to 
be used in the future to counter the democratic deficit.40 
In Iceland’s 2012 referendum, turnout was 49%, a perhaps meagre figure considering the 
clamour (both figurative and literal) of the ‘pots and pans revolution’ that took down the 
government in 2010 and set in motion the process of constitutional reform. Ireland’s two 
referendums held on the basis of recommendations made by the Constitutional Convention were 
comparatively more successful. The marriage equality referendum saw a 62% turnout41 and the 
referendum on reducing the age of eligibility to run for president a 73% turnout.42 The total 
budget for running both referendums, €15 million, also far exceeded the budget of the 
Constitutional Convention (estimated at around €900,000).43 The former in particular has been 
lauded as ‘a victory for a well-planned, positive, personal campaign over the old-style negative 
playbook’.44 Thus, the Irish process may be said to have benefitted from lessons learned from its 
predecessors. However, others have noted that the marriage equality referendum campaign ‘often 
contrasted sharply with the Convention’s more respectful, informed deliberative process’ and 
that the shift in public attitudes following the campaign, while still positive, was lower than the 
shift which had occurred during deliberations in the Convention.45  
A third broad concern may be summed up as follows. A carefully crafted micro-level process, 
even one with credible representational legitimacy, is not itself an act of demotic constitutional 
authorship; it can only establish in a fair way the issue and perhaps the process guidelines for the 
mass exercise in popular deliberation that would constitute such an act. (This is what happened 
in both Iceland and Ireland, for example, where governments chose the wording and timeline of 
the referendums based on the work of the respective constitutional conventions.) This begs the 
question: when the question is set and the referendum campaign put in motion, is any appreciable 
level of state-wide, mass popular deliberation also feasible? The very idea that a constitutional 
referendum can be an act of constitutional authorship by a public acting together hinges on the 
idea that millions of people can and will deliberate on the question. This is the key issue for 
democratic deliberation, particularly in the ambitious attempt to situate it in a referendum 
process: it is not enough that a small group of citizens participate; the democratic commitment is 
                                                          
40 Ward, ‘The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform’. 
41 Results received at the Central Count Centre for the referendum on the Thirty-fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution (Marriage Equality) Bill 2015, http://referendum.ie/results.php?ref=10. 
42 Results received at the Central Count Centre for the referendum on the Thirty-fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution (Age of Eligibility for Election to the Office of President) Bill 2015, 
http://referendum.ie/results.php?ref=11. 
43 Juno McEnroe, ‘Presidential referendum was ‘waste of money’’ (Irish Examiner, 25 May 2015), 
http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/presidential-referendum-was-waste-of-money-332620.html and Robert 
Hazell, You want a constitutional convention? This is what you need to think through first (The Constitution Unit 
blog, 8 October 2014), http://constitution-unit.com/2014/10/08/you-want-a-constitutional-convention-this-is-what-
you-need-to-think-through-first/. 
44 Jane Suiter, ‘Lessons from the Yes and No campaigns’ (The Irish Times, 27 May 2015), 
http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/jane-suiter-lessons-from-the-yes-and-no-campaigns-1.2226705. 
45 Clodagh Harris, ‘Ireland’s Marriage Referendum: A great day for equality and deliberation’ (Deliberative Hub, 3 
June 2015), https://deliberativehub.wordpress.com/2015/06/03/irelands-marriage-referendum-a-great-day-for-
equality-and-deliberation/. 
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to the widespread participation of the people as a whole, so that the outcome of the deliberation 
can be seen as genuinely an act of collective decision-making.  
However, in turning to the prospects for deliberation at the mass level we encounter new 
difficulties. Parkinson alerts us to the dangers:  
[I]f we attempt to increase the numbers involved and be more “democratic”, we run the 
risk of reopening the doors of the forum to manipulation of agendas, to speech-making 
rather than deliberation; to the attempt to sway an audience, often at the expense of, 
rather than out of feelings of reciprocity towards, one’s interlocutors …; that is, to the 
pathologies of public debate that drove many to embrace normative deliberative 
democracy in the first place.46  
There is also the question of the very possibility of such a process as raised by Walzer: 
‘Deliberation is not an activity for the demos … . 100 million of them, or even 1 million or 
100,000, cannot plausibly “reason together”’.47 To some extent it is simply a practical problem: 
how can one instigate such a process of national deliberation, finding time to do so etc. in the 
course of a referendum campaign? Certainly it is impossible to set the same goals as those for 
small group deliberation given the role of the small group in allowing each participant to raise 
issues and to have those subjected to critical exploration in dialogue with others. From all of this 
we see just how starkly different are the notions of participation and deliberation in democratic 
politics. 
Thus we seemingly have a paradox. To create the conditions for proper deliberative discussion 
we must sacrifice mass democratic participation, and to reach the level of inclusion demanded by 
democracy means surrendering the conditions for proper deliberation. But one place to begin 
questioning such a negative prognosis is to note a fundamental difference between a macro-
process and a micro-process beyond merely the number of participants. A micro-process can be 
carefully designed and planned in fairly elaborate detail and can therefore be infused self-
consciously with normative values either by elites framing the process or by the actors 
themselves, as we saw at the beginning of the deliberations of British Columbia’s Citizens’ 
Assembly. At the macro-level of mass society, by contrast, although there is an opportunity to try 
to foster the conditions for deliberation, the capacity to do so is much less. What is feasible in 
this context needs to be assessed against the reality of what happens and how voters behave in a 
referendum campaign largely on their own initiative. As Parkinson explains:  
The macro account … is much more of an attempt to provide a new descriptive theory of 
democracy, one that accounts better than previous theories for the real processes of 
opinion formation, claim making and argumentation that go on in democracies, especially 
theories which focus solely on voting without considering how options come to a vote in 
the first place.48  
                                                          
46 Parkinson, ‘Beyond “Technique”’. See also Michael Walzer, ‘Deliberation, and What Else?’ in Stephen Macedo 
(ed), Deliberative Politics: Essays on ‘Democracy and Disagreement’ (OUP 1999). 
47 Walzer, ‘Deliberation, and What Else?’, 68. Dryzek calls this the ‘large scale’ problem: John S Dryzek, 
‘Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy’ (2001) 29 Political Theory 651, 652.  
48 Parkinson, ‘Beyond “Technique”’, 4-5.  
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Perhaps, therefore, we need to look at mass participation and micro-deliberation as entirely 
different exercises in participation. While each is part of a wider democratic process, they are 
themselves radically different exercises, with very different goals and achievable outcomes.  
3. Distinguishing participation from deliberation 
It is useful to begin by considering the difference between the goals of participation versus those 
of deliberation. Participation focuses on who is involved in the decision-making process, while 
deliberation is more concerned with how that involvement takes place. Participation thus pursues 
democratic/majoritarian decision-making; maximising involvement; and achieving inclusiveness. 
Other features can be important to both participation and deliberation, for example 
representativeness and public outreach and information  
One way to assess participation is by voter turnout, for example in referendums. But this does 
not necessarily tell us much about the process of participation or the goods of participation.  
It is in fact in thicker forms of participation that we can find a link to deliberation. This brings us 
to issues of awareness-raising and engagement with the issues. Taking the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum, which was lauded as a forum for deep citizen engagement, there has 
been a focus not only upon turnout (84%), but also upon the use of social media, television and 
radio audiences. But is this engagement really deliberative: people may be bombarded with 
information or seek it out, but to what extent was this properly understood and discussed with 
others? Furthermore, does the high turnout mask the lower engagement of women and generally 
underrepresented groups?49 Another issue is the extent to which engagement varies widely 
depending upon the perceived salience of the issue to voters.50 The voting levels in independence 
referendums compared to electoral reform referendums seem to suggest that this is certainly the 
case. 
Deliberation is different from mere participation in being about discussion and exchange of 
reasons as earlier discussed. It can in fact be a highly idealised notion. For Rawls people will 
listen, consider other views (and where possible discuss their views with others); the implication 
being that this will be done in good faith, with participants open to changing their minds 
(transforming preferences)51 and willing to compromise.52 This notion of compromise implies 
finally that the ultimate aim of deliberation is the search for consensus where that is feasible.53  
But this idealised notion perhaps obscures the fact that participation and deliberation are not 
binaries and in the name of democracy must not be binaries. The ways in which micro-
deliberative bodies are being designed seek to ensure participation through representation. 
Moreover, they are structured so as to ideally work towards an exchange of reasons in a 
Rawlsian way. Thus, the hope is that where possible they will arrive at consensus even on a 
societal basis, where losers agree to if not with the decision. It may be, therefore, that we are not 
faced with an either/or choice, but simply with two different sets of considerations. What is clear 
                                                          
49 Silvia Suteu, ‘Women and Participatory Constitution-making’ in Helen Irving ed., Gender and Constitutions 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2017), 19. 
50 Lawrence LeDuc, ‘Opinion Change and Voting Behaviour in Referendums’, European Journal of Political 
Research 41:6 (2002) 711. 
51 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 138-39.  
52 Barber, Strong Democracy, 151. 
53 Chambers, ‘Deliberative Democratic Theory’, 309. 
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therefore is that structures still lack emphasis on fostering a proper linkage between the micro 
and macro levels if good micro processes are to help lead to wide popular participation, and if 
wide popular participation in, for example a referendum, is to involve a meaningful exchange of 
reasons by citizens. 
4. Linking Deliberation to Participation: recent examples in constitutional practice 
Recent experiments do seem to offer useful lessons. We will take Iceland and Ireland as 
contrasting examples of how vital it is to build linkages between participation and deliberation 
throughout. Following the 2012 referendum, the Icelandic Parliament failed to discuss the 
constitutional bill for a third time, as was required by the process, and the new constitution 
dropped amidst other priorities in the general election in 2013. A new procedure to amend the 
existing constitution by 2017 was instead proposed and thus Iceland’s crowdsourced constitution 
‘ultimately fell at the final hurdle’.54 Iceland’s failure to adopt the popularly produced 
constitutional draft has been attributed at least in part to the late involvement of political elites 
who had felt alienated from the process.55 In contrast, the initial success of the Irish process was 
explained as being in no small measure due to the respectful interactions within the convention 
and to the fact that politicians involved did not appear to dominate the debates.56 Despite the lack 
of progress on some of the Convention’s recommendations,57 the Irish experience gives hope to 
those looking for a middle way between a fully citizen-driven process and a wholly elite one, and 
for a way to ensure the former gain buy-in from the political class. 
One of the fundamental differences between participatory mechanisms and deliberative ones is 
the type of decision-making rules which govern them. The two exercises in mini-public 
deliberation in Iceland and Ireland did not, or not initially, mandate consensus decision-making. 
In Iceland, the rules indicated that majority voting was to be used, although members of the 
Constitutional Council opted to seek consensus on all decisions – a choice likely facilitated by 
the body’s small size. Conversely, in Ireland, the Constitutional Convention was to employ 
majority voting, with the (appointed) Chairman empowered to cast the deciding vote. While 
opinions among members were more evenly split on some issues on the agenda, they were 
strongly in favour of amending the constitution to allow for the recognition of same-sex 
marriages and civil partnerships (79% in favour).58 As in the Icelandic case, this near-unanimity 
among convention members was presented as proof of the salience of the issue among the public 
                                                          
54 Hélène Landemore, ‘Iceland’s ‘Crowd-sourced’ Constitution May Have Stalled, but the Experience Offers 
Lessons for Constitutional Reform in Other States’ LSE EUROPP Blog, 24 July 2014 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/07/24/icelands-crowd-sourced-constitution-may-have-stalled-but-the-
experience-offers-lessons-for-constitutional-reform-in-other-states/ accessed 10 July 2015. 
55 BT Bergsson and P Blokker, ‘The Constitutional Experiment in Iceland’ in E Bos and K Pocza (eds) 
Verfassunggebung in konsolidierten Demokratien: Neubeginn oder Verfall eines Systems? (Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlag, 2014) 171. 
56 Jane Suiter et al, ‘It’s Good to Talk: Citizen-Politician Deliberations in Ireland’s Constitutional Convention of 
2012-14’, Paper presented at ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014 (on file with author). 
57 The majority of the Irish Constitutional Convention’s recommendations were either ignored or rejected. See 
David Farrell, ‘Final Report Card on the Government’s Reactions to the Irish Constitutional 
Convention’ (23 January 2016), https://politicalreform.ie/2016/01/23/final-report-card-on-the-governments-
reactions-to-the-irish-constitutional-convention/. 
58 Third Report of the Convention on the Constitution Amending the Constitution to provide for same-sex marriage, 
June 2013, https://www.constitution.ie/AttachmentDownload.ashx?mid=c90ab08b-ece2-e211-a5a0-005056a32ee4. 
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and may have helped force the hand of otherwise reluctant politicians to put the matter to a 
popular referendum.59  
5. Conclusion: Participation and deliberation or participation versus deliberation? 
Several conclusions may be drawn. The first is that more awareness is needed of the fact that 
participatory and deliberative constitution-making processes are indeed different. They pursue 
different goals, operate based on different dynamics, and are more suited towards producing 
certain types of goods and not others. Thus, participation – exemplified by the popular 
referendum – aims to mobilise large numbers of citizens towards deciding, by way of a yes/no 
vote, on a concrete issue typically framed by political actors. Its success tends to be evaluated on 
the basis of voter turnout and clarity of the vote. Deliberation – exemplified by citizens’ 
assemblies and constitutional conventions – is more concerned with the quality of decision-
making and its capacity to induce public reason and reach consensus. Its success, therefore, is 
less easily quantifiable and may be determined in terms of reflection, responsiveness, and 
exchange of reasons.  
What is clear is that more thought is needed when considering how to integrate the two types of 
processes. The popularity of both referendums and micro-deliberative forums continues to rise, 
as does their joint use – most often in the form of referendums set up to validate the 
recommendations of constitutional conventions and citizens’ assemblies. Ireland has embarked 
on a new participatory and deliberative exercise, with a second Constitutional Convention set up 
in late 2016 to deliberate on, among other issues, constitutional reform around abortion. The 
Convention’s recommendations would again require referendum approval in order to be 
implemented. In Scotland, if the Scottish Government is successful in taking forward a proposal 
for a second independence referendum, it will be interesting to see if it learns lessons from the 
2014 process in terms of enhancing citizen deliberation. Following its 2017 provincial election, 
British Columbia looks likely to pursue a participatory process to enact electoral change once 
more. Political actors have promised a 2018 referendum on switching to proportional 
representation, as well as to ‘work together in good faith to consult British Columbians’ on the 
precise form of the new electoral system.60 The search for how best to connect referendums and 
small group deliberations could thus not be more timely.  
We need to consider more thoroughly how these distinct processes interact: how they reinforce 
and/or undermine each other’s promise of more legitimate constitution-making. This chapter has 
suggested several aspects to consider when disentangling these separate dynamics. We discussed 
the elite control syndrome and deliberation deficit of referendums, with their focus on passive 
voting and the mere aggregation of individual views. We also highlighted the shortcomings of 
small group deliberative exercises, including the legitimacy problems attached to their 
membership, their participation deficit, and the fact that they cannot, on their own, stand as acts 
of demotic authorship. A paradox thus emerges which sees participatory and deliberative 
exercises as incapable of, on their own, overcoming these limitations. 
                                                          
59 Johan A. Elkink, ‘Understanding the 2015 Marriage Referendum in Ireland: Constitutional Convention, 
Campaign, and Conservative Ireland’, Geary WP2015/21, 9 November 2015, 6, http://psai-
pdd.org/sites/default/files/document/gearywp201521.pdf. 
60 See ‘2017 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the BC Green Caucus and The BC New Democrat 
Caucus’, 1(b)(i), http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3761692-349886757-2017-Confidence-and-Supply-
Agreement.html. 
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Interesting examples exist of genuine attempts to link the deliberation of the small group to the 
participation of the wider citizenry: Iceland and Ireland stand out here, offering warnings as well 
as positive lessons. There will never be a perfect linkage between small group and full electoral 
decision-making, nor a full popular replication at mass level of the types of deliberation possible 
among small, motivated groups. But what is clear is that continued experiments in linking the 
two processes offer more and more guidance as to the various imaginative ways in which 
citizens can be better engaged in deliberative constitutional change.  
 
